By Dr. Walid Majid, Institute for Afghan Studies
Prime minister Daoud's relationship with Washington
(1953-1963)
U.S Reaction
The U.S. administration, which at the time had very good relations with the previous prime ministers (uncles of Daoud Khan), was not sure how to interpret Daoud Khan's policy changes. While some among the administration thought that the Afghans had gone over to the Soviet bloc and should be abandoned, others understood that to guarantee the nonalignment of Afghanistan the U.S. would have to increase its aid to Kabul.
Military Aid
The question of U.S. military aid was another contentious issue that marred American-Afghan relations. To be sure the Afghans had approached Washington for military aid as early as 1944. The requests which continued from the Afghan side were never taken very seriously by the Americans.
In 1950 the U.S. embassy in Kabul recommended approval of arms sales to Afghanistan in order to "exclude Soviet influence, cement Afghan-American friendship, maintain internal security and promote settlement of differences with Pakistan."[see Poullada] Poullada goes on to write:
Naturally the Afghan administration was outraged, not only because their request was once again denied, but more importantly that what was their confidential request was revealed to their regional rival, Pakistan. Further the U.S. had injected the sensitive Pushtunistan issue in its statements and had given the hint that it was siding with the Pakistanis on the long standing and historic dispute.
A month later, in January of 1955, Daoud opened a dialogue with the Soviets regarding their previous offers of military aid, which were until this point ignored by the Afghan governments. That same year the Pushtunistan dispute became hot once again and brought Kabul and Islamabad to the brink of war. An Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was convened, which approved accepting Soviet military aid by the Afghan government. At the end of 1955, in December, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan where they offered not only Soviet support for the Afghan position on Pushtunistan, but also promised to help modernize the Afghan armed forces (Hafizullah Emadi, "A Historical Perspective of the Durand Line and the Future of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations", World Review 29 (1991), pp5-12).
Poullada writes that in early 1956, Ambassador Ward, who was about to depart his post in Kabul, went to warn Daoud of the dangers of Soviet aid:
Pushtunistan Conflict
The conflict with Pakistan over the issue of Pushtunistan consumed the Daoud regime and had profound impacts on Afghan-U.S as well as Afghan-USSR relations. While the issue is too complex to be tackled in this article, it basically was inherited from previous Afghan governments since the 1890's and dealt with the fate of Pushtuns across the border on the disputed Durand Line. The Durand Line, which was drawn by the British divided Pushtuns tribes between what was British India and Afghanistan, in effect separating Afghan families living in borderland areas.
In 1947 when Pakistan was created, it declared the Durand Line to be its international boundary with Afghanistan. Even the British had not claimed this line to be an internationally accepted boundary, but rather as a line which demarcated British and Afghan spheres of influence. (For a detailed discussion of the Pushtunistan issue see: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp.425-429) The Afghan government took a strong stand against the newly formed government of Pakistan and ever since then the relations between the two nations worsened through continuing propaganda wars, Pakistani blocking of transit goods to landlocked Afghanistan and provocation of tribal sentiments against the Pakistanis by the Afghans and vice versa. (see Emadi)
Daoud, who was always an advocate of the Pushtunistan issue, made the issue one of the major goals of his administration. The USSR encouraged and masterly maneuvered the Daoud regime to go after the Pakistanis over this issue by open support of the Afghan stand and by pouring in military and economic aid as well as opening up of new transit routes for Afghan goods to avoid Pakistani measures. The Americans on the other hand took the side of Pakistan over this issue and embarrassed the Afghans, who were not asking for American support over this contentious issue, but merely for their neutral stand and an objective mediator. In 1953, then Vice President Nixon on his visit to Kabul, lectured Daoud on the Afghan stand over Pushtunistan. Poullada who interviewed Mohammad Naim, who was present during the meeting, states that according to Naim, "Nixon was patronizing, dogmatic and offensive, strongly implying that the Afghan case was just nonsense." [see Poullada] On the next leg of his trip, Nixon went to Pakistan and publicly chastised Afghanistan's policy over the issue of Pushtunistan. Finally the U.S. in 1956 at the SEATO meeting formally recognized the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, putting an end to any Afghan hope of an objective U.S. policy over this issue.
Economic Aid
Poullada states, however, that the situation started to improve beginning in 1956 with the arrival of Armin Meyer as Deputy Chief of Mission and Sheldon Mills replacing Angus Ward. The U.S. then put forth a new plan of economic aid to Afghanistan with three strategic aims: building air and road links to the West, introducing American higher education, and salvaging the Helmand Valley project. Despite the good intentions, none of these projects really succeeded to its full extent. The air and road links to the West was hampered due to the poor relations with Pakistan. The higher education program was somewhat more successful as the Americans helped in improving a number of faculties at Kabul University. The Helmand Valley project, however was a total failure (See the Helmand Valley Project).
While it is hard to pinpoint the reason(s) for these failures, it is generally believed that both sides were ill-prepared to carry out these projects. The Afghan system of government was inefficient and had too few technical experts. The American consultants who surveyed and put together the proposals, did not have a good knowledge of the working conditions and the intricacies of the Afghan society. Further the American diplomacy, specifically with regards to the military aid issue and the Pushtunistan issue, provided a difficult atmosphere for the success of the aid packages.[1]
(1953-1963)
- Abstract: Mohammad Daoud took over as Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953. His economic policy and his goal to modernize the Afghan economy and military in conjunction with his vigorous pursuit of the Pushtunistan issue had profound impacts on the relations of Afghanistan with the world's two super powers. While the USSR took advantage of the situation, Afghan-U.S. relations suffered by mistakes, misunderstandings and a lack of appreciation for the interests of the two parties by both sides.
- Economic modernization and development of Afghanistan
- Aggressive pursuit of the Pushtunistan policy
- Strengthening and modernization of the Afghan armed forces.
U.S Reaction
The U.S. administration, which at the time had very good relations with the previous prime ministers (uncles of Daoud Khan), was not sure how to interpret Daoud Khan's policy changes. While some among the administration thought that the Afghans had gone over to the Soviet bloc and should be abandoned, others understood that to guarantee the nonalignment of Afghanistan the U.S. would have to increase its aid to Kabul.
Washington, D.C., 1958: Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sign a cultural exchange agreement. Ambassador Mohammed Maiwandwal on right.[*]With the tension between Kabul and Washington on the increase, suspicion and an atmosphere of fear clouded the judgments of both sides. The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward, who had close personal relations with Daoud Khan's uncles, was very suspicious of the Prime Minister. Prof. Poullada, who was at the time stationed as the Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul writes: ("Afghanistan and United States: The Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal 35 (Spring 1981), p.178)
- Among the principle advocates of the "get tough" policy was the American ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward. He had been a hostage of the Chinese communists in Mukden, had served in Moscow and was a hard-line anti-Communist. As a man of rare personal integrity and high moral sense, he despised Daoud, whom he considered to be devious, untrustworthy and rash. Daoud fully reciprocated Ward's dislike. Ward's personal feelings were strongly supported by the King's uncles, who had been replaced by Daoud. They assured Ward that Daoud was a disaster for the country. Pakistani officials, alarmed by Daoud's policies, advocated a tough line and wanted to stir up tribal rebellions to overthrow Daoud. They urged their views on Ward with whom they were very friendly. The CIA station chief in Kabul had a strong personal influence on Ward. He was a free-wheeling, hard-drinking, pistol-packing adventurer who fancied himself a Lawrence of Afghanistan. With Pakistani colleagues and royal family dissidents he dreamed up plots to destabilize the Daoud regime.
Military Aid
The question of U.S. military aid was another contentious issue that marred American-Afghan relations. To be sure the Afghans had approached Washington for military aid as early as 1944. The requests which continued from the Afghan side were never taken very seriously by the Americans.
In 1950 the U.S. embassy in Kabul recommended approval of arms sales to Afghanistan in order to "exclude Soviet influence, cement Afghan-American friendship, maintain internal security and promote settlement of differences with Pakistan."[see Poullada] Poullada goes on to write:
- This recommendation resulted in a visit to Kabul by Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee on March 12, 1951. He discussed the request with Daoud [then Minister of War]. McGhee suggested a formal request by diplomatic note with a detailed list of desired equipment attached and assured Daoud that it would receive "sympathetic consideration". In American diplomatic parlance this means "we will take a serious look at your request" but Daoud understood it to mean that approval was assured. Afghans had always refused to make an official request unless they knew beforehand that it would be approved, but now a formal note and arms list were in the hands of Ambassador George Merrill on August 13, 1951. On November 27, 1951, Merrill was instructed by Washington to reply to Prime Minister Shah Mahmood that "the arms requested will cost $25 million. They will have to be paid for in cash. Transit through Pakistan will have to be arranged with no help from the United States. The sale will have to be made public, and it would help if the Pushtunistan claim is dropped."[US National Archives: file 890h. 20/7-2048] Shah Mahmood called this "a political refusal" since it could not be accepted by any Afghan government. Daoud's reaction is unrecorded and probably unprintable.
Washington, D.C., 1958: Prime Minister Daoud and Vice President Nixon visit the U.S. Capitol Building.[*]
Naturally the Afghan administration was outraged, not only because their request was once again denied, but more importantly that what was their confidential request was revealed to their regional rival, Pakistan. Further the U.S. had injected the sensitive Pushtunistan issue in its statements and had given the hint that it was siding with the Pakistanis on the long standing and historic dispute.
A month later, in January of 1955, Daoud opened a dialogue with the Soviets regarding their previous offers of military aid, which were until this point ignored by the Afghan governments. That same year the Pushtunistan dispute became hot once again and brought Kabul and Islamabad to the brink of war. An Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was convened, which approved accepting Soviet military aid by the Afghan government. At the end of 1955, in December, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan where they offered not only Soviet support for the Afghan position on Pushtunistan, but also promised to help modernize the Afghan armed forces (Hafizullah Emadi, "A Historical Perspective of the Durand Line and the Future of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations", World Review 29 (1991), pp5-12).
Poullada writes that in early 1956, Ambassador Ward, who was about to depart his post in Kabul, went to warn Daoud of the dangers of Soviet aid:
- He cautioned Daoud that Soviet economic aid was laying a logistical infrastructure for a Soviet invasion. The road and bridge tolerances, the spaced fuel and grain depots, the Salang tunnel which breached the great mountain barrier against invasion, were graphic examples. In addition he warned Daoud that training military officers in the USSR could create a fifth column in the heart of the Afghan armed forces.
Pushtunistan Conflict
The conflict with Pakistan over the issue of Pushtunistan consumed the Daoud regime and had profound impacts on Afghan-U.S as well as Afghan-USSR relations. While the issue is too complex to be tackled in this article, it basically was inherited from previous Afghan governments since the 1890's and dealt with the fate of Pushtuns across the border on the disputed Durand Line. The Durand Line, which was drawn by the British divided Pushtuns tribes between what was British India and Afghanistan, in effect separating Afghan families living in borderland areas.
In 1947 when Pakistan was created, it declared the Durand Line to be its international boundary with Afghanistan. Even the British had not claimed this line to be an internationally accepted boundary, but rather as a line which demarcated British and Afghan spheres of influence. (For a detailed discussion of the Pushtunistan issue see: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp.425-429) The Afghan government took a strong stand against the newly formed government of Pakistan and ever since then the relations between the two nations worsened through continuing propaganda wars, Pakistani blocking of transit goods to landlocked Afghanistan and provocation of tribal sentiments against the Pakistanis by the Afghans and vice versa. (see Emadi)
Daoud, who was always an advocate of the Pushtunistan issue, made the issue one of the major goals of his administration. The USSR encouraged and masterly maneuvered the Daoud regime to go after the Pakistanis over this issue by open support of the Afghan stand and by pouring in military and economic aid as well as opening up of new transit routes for Afghan goods to avoid Pakistani measures. The Americans on the other hand took the side of Pakistan over this issue and embarrassed the Afghans, who were not asking for American support over this contentious issue, but merely for their neutral stand and an objective mediator. In 1953, then Vice President Nixon on his visit to Kabul, lectured Daoud on the Afghan stand over Pushtunistan. Poullada who interviewed Mohammad Naim, who was present during the meeting, states that according to Naim, "Nixon was patronizing, dogmatic and offensive, strongly implying that the Afghan case was just nonsense." [see Poullada] On the next leg of his trip, Nixon went to Pakistan and publicly chastised Afghanistan's policy over the issue of Pushtunistan. Finally the U.S. in 1956 at the SEATO meeting formally recognized the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, putting an end to any Afghan hope of an objective U.S. policy over this issue.
Economic Aid
Poullada states, however, that the situation started to improve beginning in 1956 with the arrival of Armin Meyer as Deputy Chief of Mission and Sheldon Mills replacing Angus Ward. The U.S. then put forth a new plan of economic aid to Afghanistan with three strategic aims: building air and road links to the West, introducing American higher education, and salvaging the Helmand Valley project. Despite the good intentions, none of these projects really succeeded to its full extent. The air and road links to the West was hampered due to the poor relations with Pakistan. The higher education program was somewhat more successful as the Americans helped in improving a number of faculties at Kabul University. The Helmand Valley project, however was a total failure (See the Helmand Valley Project).
While it is hard to pinpoint the reason(s) for these failures, it is generally believed that both sides were ill-prepared to carry out these projects. The Afghan system of government was inefficient and had too few technical experts. The American consultants who surveyed and put together the proposals, did not have a good knowledge of the working conditions and the intricacies of the Afghan society. Further the American diplomacy, specifically with regards to the military aid issue and the Pushtunistan issue, provided a difficult atmosphere for the success of the aid packages.[1]
