His lonely war

Written By: Abdur Rauf Yousafzai[1], in The Friday Times (Pakistan’s First Independent Weekly Paper), 14 Oct 2016

Mohammad Najibullah
His lonely war

Mohammad Najibullah, last president of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, was silenced in 1996 by the Taliban. Abdur Rauf Yousafzai meets those in Pakistan who knew him and still feel that his ideas are relevant today.

Dr. Mohammad Najibullah and his brother Shahpur Ahmadzai were killed by Afghan Taliban on the 26th of September 1996 in the UN compound in Kabul city. The dead bodies were dragged through the streets and were hanged in the main square of Kabul by the newly victorious Taliban.

The man may be dead, but his ideas and solutions for Afghanistan’s conflict retain their relevance, at least for some.

Consider, for instance, that Engineer Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, chief of Hizb-e-Islami Afghanistan, did what he had rejected some 26 years ago, when it was offered by Dr. Najibullah under a ‘National Reconciliation Policy’. Soon after assuming the office of President at the end of November 1987, Dr. Najibullah had not only developed a plan for pulling Soviet troops out of Afghanistan but he had announced a National Reconciliation Policy, offering power-sharing arrangements with the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance (Mujahideen) leaders.

Just recently, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar signed a peace agreement with the government of Dr. Ashraf Ghani. This peace agreement is similar to that offered by Dr. Najib soon after assuming charge as Secretary General of former ruling People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) in November 1986.

“Najib’s death and the humiliation of his dead body was a message to all progressives on both sides of the Durand Line”

Mian Iftikhar Hussain – former information minister of Pakistan’s Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province and a veritable wall against the Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – had met the communist Afghan President many times. Mian Iftikhar shares his experiences from his meetings with Dr Najib:

“I remember some of my meetings with Dr. Najib on the 77th independence day of Afghanistan. I was in Kabul. Pakhtun nationalist leader Wali Khan and Dr. Najib were returning from Moscow and I was in the queue of those who had gathered to receive the gentlemen. When Wali Khan saw me, he smiled and told Najib, ‘In Moscow, students were asking about this guy!’” Najib told me after four days that he would call me for a meeting. Najib was an intellectual and a broadminded nationalist leader – he was inspired by the Bacha Khan and Wali Khan tradition of politics.”

Mian Iftikhar goes on:

“There was a beautiful presidential palace in the heart of Kabul but Dr. sahib was living in a very small home. One day, he invited us for dinner. Everyone was astonished when we saw that he was living in a very simple and small house. I heard his speeches – his personality was towering and whenever he delivered a speech, his voice was like thunder!”

Najib, to some in Afghanistan “the symbol of peace”, had started his politics from the days of when he was a student. His worldview revolved around socialism, communism and humanism. Iftikhar narrates that late one night, Najib came alone to his apartment for a visit.

“It was winter and Dr. Sahib was wrapped in a Pakhtun chadar (mantle). I told the embattled president that the times were not conducive to his travelling alone in such a manner. The brave president replied, ‘This is my Haywad [motherland] and I want to convey the message to terrorists that I am ready to sacrifice my life.’ Dr. Najib was, for me at least, a visionary and the way he was able to unite people from various national and ethnic groups in Afghanistan around him – history shows that after him the Afghan land has not produced such a widely acceptable personality in politic.

Za da watan, watan zma day


Za da watan da para sar Qurbanwoma


[Born out of my soil. I sacrifice my life for the sake of my land]

Dr. Sahib recited for me this Tappa many a time and to me it shows that he was well aware of the consequences in opposing American Cold War interests.”

Even today, Mian Iftikhar Hussain goes on appealing to the UN to investigate the murder of Najib, a man he considers to be a great leader. For some, the fact that Najib’s last refuge was in a UN compound and the fact that he was dragged to his death from there by the Taliban, places at least some of the responsibility for his death at the hands of the UN too.

Mian Iftikhar, in fact, insists:

“History will repeatedly say that the UN was also responsible for his murder. Dr. Najib being killed and the humiliation of his dead body was a message to all progressive nationalists on both sides of the Durand Line – to terrorise the followers of the philosophy of Bacha Khan.”

As war raged in the countryside, Najibullah’s government sought to maintain control in major cities

Ameen Jan, now a senior leader of Pakistan’s left-wing Awami Workers’ Party (AWP), was in exile at Kabul during General Zia-ul-Haq’s pro-Western military regime. During his stay in Kabul, he was able to meet Afghanistan’s last communist president many times. He summarised his experiences with Najib during his exile as follows:

“I have met Dr. Sahib before his presidential period but he was a powerful man even then. And he called me few times after taking the presidential oath. He was very clear in his vision and policy – he wanted to see a peaceful, modern, educated and prosperous Afghanistan and have smooth and cordial relations with all neighbours. I spent many years in Afghanistan and observed the PDPA government keenly. To me, it seemed like the best ideology for opposing imperialism...”

Like Mian Iftikhar Hussain, Ameen Jan also testifies to Najib’s love of the Pashto tappa of poetry in general. Ameen Jan recalls that Najib often complained of his situation with the following verse:

“Pa Lara zam tola shrangeegam


Sta da tuhmat zanzeer pa ghara garzwoma”


[Going on the way, I produce a jingling sound] [I carry a chain of your blotch round my neck]

Ameen Jan goes on to offer his analysis of Najib’s role in the 1980s as follows:

“During the Cold War, Pakistan and Afghanistan were part of opposite global camps and the Jamaat-e-Islami and other right-wing political forces had propagated against what they described as ‘atheistic communism’. Ironically these parties were supporting the Pakistan-China friendship – knowing full well that by their own logic, the Chinese leadership was at least as ‘atheistic’ and ‘godless’ as that of the Soviet Union. The argument is made by sympathisers of the pro-Moscow PDPA regime in Kabul that much of the anti-communist sentiment that drove the ‘jihad’ in Afghanistan was manufactured by a confluence of interests between the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistani elites. In his own time, Najibullah was the unquestioned leader of Pakhtun progressives on both sides of the Durand Line and it earned him the enmity of many powers.

Najib was well aware about the prospect of his death in the near future and therefore once he said to me, ‘In the coming days, the world will witness a bloodbath in this region’.”

Ameen Jan pauses and then concludes:

“And yes, the Russians had betrayed their longtime honest friend...”

A Soviet special operations (Spetsnaz) unit preparing for a mission in 1988

Shamim Shahid, senior journalist and expert on Afghanistan, from his reminiscences of Najibullah, describes the latter’s political vision in the following words:

“In 1986, Mohammad Khan Chamkani was declared acting President and Dr. Najib became Secretary General of the Soviet-backed PDPA government in Afghanistan. During this period, Najib declared a ‘National Reconciliation Policy’ which was formally endorsed by traditional Loya Jirga, held on the 29th and 30th of November and the 1st of December, 1987, at Kabul. Besides endorsing the national reconciliation policy, the Loya Jirga had also elected Dr. Najibillah as President of Afghanistan.

Through the National Reconciliation Policy, Najib had declared a general amnesty for all those who were engaged in armed resistance and hostilities against the government. Similarly, he offered transfer of power to a broad-based transitional government. Even later he announced his willingness for a transfer of power to seven Peshawar-based mujahideen groups, the famed Islamic Unity of Afghan Mujahideen (IUAM). But all such offers were rejected by Peshawar-based Afghan parties.”

Shamim is of the view that some of the mujahideen parties, the ‘moderate’ groups like Afghan National Liberation Front led by Sibghatullah Mujaddadi, the National Islamic Front of Pir Syed Ahmad Gillani and Harakat e Islami Afghanistan of Maulvi Nabi Mohammadi neither rejected nor accepted in public the ideas of Dr. Najib. But these three parties were helpless due to the hard stance of the remaining four parties. Besides Hekmatyar’s Hezb e Islami Afghanistan (HIA), the Jamiat Islami Afghanistan of Prof. Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ittehad e Islami of Abdul Rab Sayaf chose to take a particularly hard line towards the PDPA regime.

In such a context, came the Geneva Accord, agreeing on a schedule for pulling Soviet troops out of Afghanistan. The then Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo was running the affairs of Pakistan. It was believed that Premier Junejo, without the consent of president Zia-ul-Haq, had sent the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Zain Noorani, for the signing of the Geneva Accord. Wakeel Ahmad, Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, was the second signatory and it was guaranteed by the USSR and the USA.

Najbullah’s strategy involved a Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan while maintaining significant support from Moscow for the PDPA regime in Kabul

Shamim says:

“At its peak, Najib’s policy of reconciliation won him significant popularity in Afghanistan. But at the end of 1988, Zia’s government and Saudi Arabia sponsored a meeting of the Peshawar-based IUAM shura, which elected a parallel government with Prof. Sibghatullah Mujaddadi as President and Rasool Sayaf as Prime Minister. The first ever meeting of the parallel exiled Afghan government, dominated by mujahideen, was arranged in mountainous caves just on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in the Khost province, in January 1989. Media teams from all over the world arrived to cover it, Shamim remembers.

Later, the defense minister Shah Nawaz Tanai along with Interior Affairs minister Syed Mohammad Gulabzai and General Abdul Qadir, with support from the mujahideen, launched a decisive coup against Najib’s government in Kabul. The coup was foiled and Tanai with his aides succeeded in escaping to Pakistan with the help of Hekmatyar’s supporters.“

Najibullah’s body on display after his brutal death at the hands of the Taliban in 1996

Shamim recalls that Najib was unfazed:

“Despite facing and foiling a well-organised coup against him, Najibullah remained firm on his commitments regarding national reconciliation. After foiling the coup, Dr. Najib had visited various provinces and cities where he had addressed traditional jirgas and he even arranged a traditional Loya Jirga in 1990, which announced an end to the communist policies of his administration. The PDPA was renamed as Watan Party (Homeland Party). In his speeches before the jirga and its delegates, Dr. Najib had again told the resistance leaders that foreign powers were reluctant to let peace return to Afghanistan. He even predicted continued conflict in the region after the fall of the Soviet Union!”

On August 2, 1990, in his office at Kabul, I met Najibullah amidst the process of the Soviet Union’s collapse. He had floated the idea of an alliance and understanding amongst different nationalities of the region – the Pakhtuns, Punjabis, Baloch, Uzbeks and Tajiks for foiling attempts at a continuation of violence using the slogan of Islam and jihad. Even in his speeches, he pleaded before warlords Hekmatyar, Sayaf, Rabbani and Khalis to be aware of “mysterious elements” who, he said, were determined to turn Afghanistan into a battlefield for yet another round of war.

The PDPA regime attempted to mobilise women in militias to support operations against the fundamentalist mujahideen units

It was not to be.

General Dostam began a revolt against Najib on Nauroz (March 21, 1992) at Mazar e Sharif, which finally lead to the fall of Kabul to Ahmad Shah Masoud and Dostam’s forces on April 16, 1992. Najibullah along with his brother and close aides took shelter in the UN compound at the Wazir Akbar Khan area as Kabul fell to another round of violence.

It was to be his last move.

Shamim tells me:

“I admire Najib fore seeing the destructive future of the region. He knew this land will become a battlefield for many countries and the ultimate price would be paid by the people of Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

[1]- Abdur Rauf Yousafzai is a journalist based in Peshawar. He may be reached at journalist.rauf@gmail.com

Afghanistan's Rush to Save Ancient Treasures

From: National Geographic Magazine, By: Hannah Bloch, Photographs by Simon Norfolk, September 2015

Mega Copper Deal in Afghanistan Fuels
Rush to Save Ancient Treasures

Under threat of Taliban attack, archaeologists are excavating a spectacular Buddhist complex before it’s obliterated by a huge mining operation.

About an hour’s drive along the Gardez highway south of Kabul, beyond the bustling shops, the trucks spewing diesel exhaust, and the clatter of donkey carts, there is a sharp left turn onto an unpaved road. In a district of Logar Province friendly to the Taliban, the vicinity has been shaken by roadside bombs, intermittent rocket attacks, kidnappings, and murders. The road continues along a dry riverbed, past small villages, paramilitary roadblocks, sentry towers, and an empty, blue-roofed compound cordoned off with concertina wire.

A little farther on, the view opens onto a treeless valley creased with trenches and exposed ancient walls. Over the past seven years a team of Afghan and international archaeologists, supported by up to 650 laborers, has uncovered thousands of Buddhist statues, manuscripts, coins, and holy monuments. Entire monasteries and fortifications have come to light, dating back as far as the third century a.d. More than a hundred check posts surround the site, which is patrolled day and night by some 1,700 police.

The excavation is by far the most ambitious in Afghanistan’s history. But the security wasn’t put in place just to protect a few scientists and some local workers. Buried below the ancient ruins is a lode of copper ore that extends two and a half miles across and runs a mile or more into the Baba Wali mountain, which dominates the site. It ranks as one of the world’s largest untapped deposits, containing an estimated 12.5 million tons of copper. In antiquity, copper made the Buddhist monks here wealthy; colossal deposits of purple, blue, and green slag, the solidified residue from their smelting, spill down the slopes of Baba Wali, attesting to production on a nearly industrial scale. The Afghan government hopes that copper will help make the country wealthy again, or at least self-sufficient.

Open Pit Mine Can Save Rather Than Destroy Artifacts

The name of this place is understated: Mes Aynak, “little copper well.” There is nothing little about Mes Aynak. In 2007 the Beijing-based China Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC), leading a state-backed consortium, won rights to extract the copper here on a 30-year lease. (China is ravenous for copper: It now consumes half the world’s supply.) The company made a bid worth more than three billion dollars and promised to provide infrastructure for this isolated, underdeveloped district, including roads, a railway, and a 400-megawatt electricity plant. Afghan officials estimated that the mine would provide a $1.2 billion infusion into the country’s fragile economy, dependent since 2002 on foreign assistance and now facing a seven-billion-dollar annual deficit.

Stained by copper in the soil, a skeleton lies next to a stupa at Mes Aynak. Whether the individual lived when the monasteries were functioning or in a later era is unknown.

Mes Aynak’s archaeological potential has been known for decades. When the Chinese deal became public, Afghan cultural heritage advocates demanded that the place’s ancient treasures be excavated and recorded properly before they were lost to an open-pit mine. But the artifacts were already in danger: not from destruction by the Taliban, but from being plucked out piecemeal by looters, lost to science. “If it will not be destroyed by mining, it will be destroyed by looting,” says French archaeologist Philippe Marquis, who directed excavations at the site from 2009 to 2014. Better, he says, to document as much as possible now in a systematic way.

Despite the heavy security, present-day dangers have delayed the mine’s development. The blue-roofed compound, built for Chinese engineers, was abandoned after a series of rocket attacks in 2012 and 2013. Land mines left behind by the Soviets in the 1980s and explosive devices left more recently by the Taliban and al Qaeda pose yet another danger, and eight mine-clearing specialists were killed by the Taliban in 2014. (When Afghanistan was under Taliban control, Mes Aynak was the site of an elite al Qaeda camp where four of the hijackers who took part in the 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., underwent training, according to the 9/11 Commission.)

Add to the security challenges the logistical complications—the lack of a railway to transport the copper out of the region and a serious scarcity of water—and it’s no surprise that mining, originally projected to start in 2012, has not yet commenced. In 2013 the MCC began to back off from some terms of its contract, and the two sides have yet to renegotiate the agreement. It’s unlikely that any extraction will take place before 2018, if then.

Delays in the copper mining have given archaeologists considerably more time to excavate. The past they’re revealing presents a stark contrast to the violence and disorder of their own time.

“Kanishka’s coinage was valued from Rome to China,” says longtime Kabul resident Nancy Hatch Dupree, 87, the U.S.-born grande dame of Afghan heritage scholars. “There are 23 gods and goddesses on Kushan coinage. This symbolizes tolerance. This was a time when people were broadening their thinking.”

Though much is known about ancient Buddhism’s links to trade and commerce, little is known about its relationship to industrial production. This is where Mes Aynak may be able to fill in important blanks, hinting at a more complex Buddhist economic system than has been previously understood. Unlike the far better known Bamian—an ancient Buddhist pilgrimage site and Silk Road caravan center 125 miles to the northwest, formerly home to two colossal, sixth-century Buddha statues carved out of a cliff face, blasted to rubble by the Taliban in 2001—Mes Aynak seems to have thrived primarily because it was a copper extraction and production hub, a Pittsburgh to Bamian’s New York. The sacred monastic complexes are right on top of the copper ore.

“I do not know of any other site where monasteries coexisted in perfect [symbiosis] with production or industrial centers,” says Zemaryalai Tarzi, an Afghan archaeologist who first visited Mes Aynak with a French team in 1973. “These kinds of tight relationships between Buddhist monasteries and the industrial or commercial exploiters of natural resources have no precedent.”

An Abundance of Riches

Puzzling out the full meaning of Mes Aynak will require decades—and a new generation of archaeologists. After earning his degree at Kabul University, Sultan Masoud Muradi, 24, the son of a Kabul construction worker, competed to take part in excavations at the site. He’s proud that he and his colleagues represent different ethnicities and work easily together—no small matter in a country riven in the 1990s by a horrific civil war among mujahideen groups divided along ethnic lines. “We have 5,000 years of history, and for Afghanistan’s new generation, it’s very important to know about it,” he says, holding a small shovel while taking a break from digging. “Otherwise we are just famous for terrorism and poppy production.”

Mes Aynak’s landscape is completely deforested today, and it’s possible that ancient copper smelting played a role in the area’s denuding—which in turn may have ended copper production. Huge quantities of wood had to be burned to make charcoal, and up to 20 pounds of charcoal could be required to extract a single pound of copper from ore. Enough was needed to heat a fire to almost 2,000 degrees Fahrenheit and keep a small furnace roaring up to several days.

Thomas Eley, an archaeometallurgy specialist from Great Britain who did fieldwork at Mes Aynak in 2012, has detected a shift in its copper production over time from a relatively efficient form of smelting to a slower and more painstaking process—the opposite of what he’d expected to find. But the more efficient process, known as tapped smelting, also happens to be more fuel intensive. As the supply of trees for making charcoal dwindled, the smelters could have been forced to fall back on the slower method.

Processing so much copper also required a reliable water supply to wash the ore and quench white-hot ingots. That water probably came from mountain springs, shallow streams, and ancient underground irrigation channels called karez, which are still used in parts of Afghanistan. One 30-foot-long karez has been excavated in the northern section of the site, probably part of a network of such channels. The ongoing deforestation could have reduced the area’s rainfall, making water even scarcer.

A paucity of water remains a concern in this drought-prone region, and a major obstacle to future mining. Integrity Watch Afghanistan, a Kabul think tank, reported in 2013 that villagers around Mes Aynak complained that the water table dropped by more than six feet after preliminary drilling. “When copper production starts, it will require seven million liters [1.85 million gallons] in one eight-hour shift,” says Javed Noorani, who authored the Integrity Watch report. “The area is already water deficient.”

A detail of a copper and gold bowl from Tepe Baba Wali at Mes Aynak depicts a snarling lion.

The archaeologists must cope with a problem not of scarcity but of overabundance: The rate at which the excavation has proceeded risks outpacing the ability to store and protect everything coming out of the ground. “Excavation is easy,” says Omar Sultan, Afghanistan’s former deputy culture minister and a Greek-trained archaeologist. “Safeguarding is the hard thing to do.”

More than a thousand of the most important pieces have gone straight to the National Museum of Afghanistan in Kabul. “Unfortunately we cannot accept all the artifacts,” says Omara Khan Massoudi, for many years the director of the museum. “There is no place for them.”

For now the thousands of Mes Aynak objects that aren’t at the museum sit in temporary storage at or near the site. Most have not been analyzed or studied. Massoudi and Sultan talk of erecting a local museum someday, but more likely, at least in the short term, there would be a virtual museum and online reconstruction to preserve Mes Aynak’s memory after the mining begins.

But first Afghanistan’s security challenges must be resolved. And in the long term more mining delays could pose more dire threats. Mes Aynak’s security depends in large part on ensuring that local men, vulnerable to the lure or coercion of the Taliban, stay gainfully employed. Many resent having been displaced from their villages to make way for the copper mine. The World Bank, which has been supporting the archaeological work through a project with Afghanistan’s Ministry of Mines and Petroleum, estimates that the mine will eventually provide 4,500 direct jobs and many more thousands of indirect ones, though there’s growing skepticism that the jobs will ever materialize.

Over the years a few hundred men have been paid generously by local standards to wield pickaxes and shovels or do other menial work at the archaeological site. But “if you have no food or salary, when your children are hungry, you’ll do anything,” says Habib Rahman. “Maybe join the Taliban. They pay a salary.” In 2001 the gray-bearded, 42-year-old father lost a leg to a land mine while herding goats. Now he walks with the aid of crutches two hours each way from his mountain village to wash pottery sherds at Mes Aynak.

The hardscrabble lives of locals like Rahman are not likely to change much in the immediate future. Many are ambivalent about the rich history they’re helping reveal, feeling no personal ties to a pre-Islamic past. It doesn’t help that the Taliban have threatened some workers, accusing them of promoting Buddhism. Still, there’s admiration for the achievements of the past. “My forefathers were Muslim,” says one 36-year-old laborer and Afghan Army veteran who gave his name only as Javed. “But we know a lot of generations passed through this ground. When I am working, I am thinking that here was a civilization, a factory, a city, kings here. Yes, this is Afghanistan also.”

U.K.-based photographer Simon Norfolk specializes in landscapes. Over the past 12 years he has explored through his work the meaning of the word “battlefield” and the many ways it can be interpreted.

Society Grant Satellite mapping of Mes Aynak was funded by your National Geographic membership.

The Early Years Of U.S.-Afghan Relations

From: Meridian International Center

In Small Things Remembered
The Early Years Of U.S.-Afghan Relations

With the signing of the Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919, the modern nation of Afghanistan was formed under Emir Amanullah. Just eight years earlier, an engineer formerly of the General Electric Company had arrived to build a hydroelectric plant near Kabul, becoming one of the first Americans to live and work in the country. His endeavors anticipated the moment of official contact between the two nations. In 1921, the Emir sent a delegation led by Mohammed Wali on a Western tour to solicit diplomatic recognition for his fledgling country. Upon their return, the envoys presented a letter that caused great excitement: greetings from President Warren G. Harding of the United States.

To President Harding, as to most Americans at that time, Afghanistan was a mysterious and exotic land on the other side of the world. Harding’s salutation provided the initial spark for what would emerge as a long and fruitful relationship. This was characterized by successes – both large and small – mostly lost to history, but vivid in the memories of those who experienced them. From 1946 to 1978, massive infrastructure programs, including engineering and construction initiatives funded by the International Cooperation Administration (ICA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), were a key component of American involvement in Afghanistan. Simultaneously, official visits by dignitaries created the framework that sustained a burgeoning friendship. As of the early 1970s, the U.S. government had spent more than $500 million on assistance and development programs in Afghanistan, making it the recipient of one of the largest cumulative foreign aid efforts in U.S. history.

Notwithstanding the importance of such development projects, education and cultural efforts emerged as the heart and soul of U.S.-Afghan relations because they brought people together as friends and colleagues. Numerous American teachers, engineers, doctors, scholars, diplomats, and explorers traversed Afghanistan’s rugged landscape where they lived and worked alongside its citizens. These visitors were moved by the majestic beauty of the country and unparalleled kindness of its people. Similarly, countless Afghans went to the United States for academic studies, training, employment, business, and official meetings, cultivating close connections with Americans. The ultimate goal of these partnerships was to create a group of Afghan professionals and specialized workers whose skills would benefit future generations. Americans and Afghans alike felt pride in their shared accomplishments.

Today, nearly a century after that first American engineer arrived in Kabul, we remember not only the monumental undertakings, but also countless small moments of camaraderie. This exhibition offers a human perspective through photographs and documents that capture the essence of U.S.-Afghan relations. These seminal experiences in the lives of people from both countries, and the connection forged between the United States and Afghanistan, should not be forgotten.

* * *

Sources: This Exhibition is organized by Meridian International Center, Washington, D.C. with support from the U.S. Department of State.

Prime minister Daoud

By Dr. Walid Majid, Institute for Afghan Studies

Prime minister Daoud's relationship with Washington
(1953-1963)

Abstract: Mohammad Daoud took over as Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 1953. His economic policy and his goal to modernize the Afghan economy and military in conjunction with his vigorous pursuit of the Pushtunistan issue had profound impacts on the relations of Afghanistan with the world's two super powers. While the USSR took advantage of the situation, Afghan-U.S. relations suffered by mistakes, misunderstandings and a lack of appreciation for the interests of the two parties by both sides.

In 1953 Mohammad Daoud, first cousin and brother-in-law of the Afghan King Mohammad Zahir Shah, took over the reign of the government and became the prime minister of Afghanistan. He was well known among the Afghans and had a reputation for his drive and energy. His policies were aimed to achieve three goals:

1. Economic modernization and development of Afghanistan
   
2. Aggressive pursuit of the Pushtunistan policy
   
3. Strengthening and modernization of the Afghan armed forces.
   
   

To achieve his ambitious goals, Prime Minister Daoud understood the need and reliance for greater foreign aid. He adopted a policy whereby the Afghan government moved closer to the Soviet Union attracting large sums of Eastern bloc aid. At the same time he hoped that the American government with the onset of the Cold War would also increase their aid to Afghanistan, fostering Soviet-American competition in the country.

U.S Reaction

The U.S. administration, which at the time had very good relations with the previous prime ministers (uncles of Daoud Khan), was not sure how to interpret Daoud Khan's policy changes. While some among the administration thought that the Afghans had gone over to the Soviet bloc and should be abandoned, others understood that to guarantee the nonalignment of Afghanistan the U.S. would have to increase its aid to Kabul.

Washington, D.C., 1958: Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles sign a cultural exchange agreement. Ambassador Mohammed Maiwandwal on right.[*]

With the tension between Kabul and Washington on the increase, suspicion and an atmosphere of fear clouded the judgments of both sides. The U.S. ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward, who had close personal relations with Daoud Khan's uncles, was very suspicious of the Prime Minister. Prof. Poullada, who was at the time stationed as the Economic Counselor at the U.S. Embassy in Kabul writes: ("Afghanistan and United States: The Crucial Years", The Middle East Journal 35 (Spring 1981), p.178)

Among the principle advocates of the "get tough" policy was the American ambassador in Kabul, Angus Ward. He had been a hostage of the Chinese communists in Mukden, had served in Moscow and was a hard-line anti-Communist. As a man of rare personal integrity and high moral sense, he despised Daoud, whom he considered to be devious, untrustworthy and rash. Daoud fully reciprocated Ward's dislike. Ward's personal feelings were strongly supported by the King's uncles, who had been replaced by Daoud. They assured Ward that Daoud was a disaster for the country. Pakistani officials, alarmed by Daoud's policies, advocated a tough line and wanted to stir up tribal rebellions to overthrow Daoud. They urged their views on Ward with whom they were very friendly. The CIA station chief in Kabul had a strong personal influence on Ward. He was a free-wheeling, hard-drinking, pistol-packing adventurer who fancied himself a Lawrence of Afghanistan. With Pakistani colleagues and royal family dissidents he dreamed up plots to destabilize the Daoud regime.

Poullada further states that none of these maneuvers were either sanctioned or even known in Washington. Daoud Khan, however, was not aware of this and through his intelligence service when he found out about these efforts, he assumed they reflected official U.S. policy towards his regime. It was during this time period when Daoud moved against a number of internal enemies, whom he considered as plotters against his regime. These events certainly played a crucial role in moving Daoud closer to the Soviets who had their own long-term plans.

Military Aid

The question of U.S. military aid was another contentious issue that marred American-Afghan relations. To be sure the Afghans had approached Washington for military aid as early as 1944. The requests which continued from the Afghan side were never taken very seriously by the Americans.

In 1950 the U.S. embassy in Kabul recommended approval of arms sales to Afghanistan in order to "exclude Soviet influence, cement Afghan-American friendship, maintain internal security and promote settlement of differences with Pakistan."[see Poullada] Poullada goes on to write:

This recommendation resulted in a visit to Kabul by Assistant Secretary of State George McGhee on March 12, 1951. He discussed the request with Daoud [then Minister of War]. McGhee suggested a formal request by diplomatic note with a detailed list of desired equipment attached and assured Daoud that it would receive "sympathetic consideration". In American diplomatic parlance this means "we will take a serious look at your request" but Daoud understood it to mean that approval was assured. Afghans had always refused to make an official request unless they knew beforehand that it would be approved, but now a formal note and arms list were in the hands of Ambassador George Merrill on August 13, 1951. On November 27, 1951, Merrill was instructed by Washington to reply to Prime Minister Shah Mahmood that "the arms requested will cost $25 million. They will have to be paid for in cash. Transit through Pakistan will have to be arranged with no help from the United States. The sale will have to be made public, and it would help if the Pushtunistan claim is dropped."[US National Archives: file 890h. 20/7-2048] Shah Mahmood called this "a political refusal" since it could not be accepted by any Afghan government. Daoud's reaction is unrecorded and probably unprintable.

Despite previous disappointments, Daoud tried once again to approach the Americans as soon as he took over as the new Prime Minister. On October 8, 1954, Mohammad Naim, the Afghan Foreign Minister [brother of the Prime Minister and most trusted advisor] met in Washington with John Foster Dulles, the U.S. Secretary of State. Naim once again made an official request for military aid for Afghanistan. A few months later on December 28, Dulles sent a note to the Afghan Ambassador in Washington, Kabir Ludin, stating that "after some careful consideration, extending military aid to Afghanistan would create problems not offset by the strength it would create." [see Poullada] Dulles went on to urge that instead the Pushtunistan issue should be settled. A copy of this note was also sent to the Pakistani ambassador in Washington!

Washington, D.C., 1958: Prime Minister Daoud and Vice President Nixon visit the U.S. Capitol Building.[*]

Naturally the Afghan administration was outraged, not only because their request was once again denied, but more importantly that what was their confidential request was revealed to their regional rival, Pakistan. Further the U.S. had injected the sensitive Pushtunistan issue in its statements and had given the hint that it was siding with the Pakistanis on the long standing and historic dispute.

A month later, in January of 1955, Daoud opened a dialogue with the Soviets regarding their previous offers of military aid, which were until this point ignored by the Afghan governments. That same year the Pushtunistan dispute became hot once again and brought Kabul and Islamabad to the brink of war. An Afghan Loya Jirga (Grand Assembly) was convened, which approved accepting Soviet military aid by the Afghan government. At the end of 1955, in December, Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Afghanistan where they offered not only Soviet support for the Afghan position on Pushtunistan, but also promised to help modernize the Afghan armed forces (Hafizullah Emadi, "A Historical Perspective of the Durand Line and the Future of Afghanistan-Pakistan Relations", World Review 29 (1991), pp5-12).

Poullada writes that in early 1956, Ambassador Ward, who was about to depart his post in Kabul, went to warn Daoud of the dangers of Soviet aid:

He cautioned Daoud that Soviet economic aid was laying a logistical infrastructure for a Soviet invasion. The road and bridge tolerances, the spaced fuel and grain depots, the Salang tunnel which breached the great mountain barrier against invasion, were graphic examples. In addition he warned Daoud that training military officers in the USSR could create a fifth column in the heart of the Afghan armed forces.

Daoud, who was frustrated with what he saw as continuing U.S. siding with the Pakistanis, dismissed his concerns and instead complained about the refusal of the U.S. administration for not taking their requests seriously.

Pushtunistan Conflict

The conflict with Pakistan over the issue of Pushtunistan consumed the Daoud regime and had profound impacts on Afghan-U.S as well as Afghan-USSR relations. While the issue is too complex to be tackled in this article, it basically was inherited from previous Afghan governments since the 1890's and dealt with the fate of Pushtuns across the border on the disputed Durand Line. The Durand Line, which was drawn by the British divided Pushtuns tribes between what was British India and Afghanistan, in effect separating Afghan families living in borderland areas.

In 1947 when Pakistan was created, it declared the Durand Line to be its international boundary with Afghanistan. Even the British had not claimed this line to be an internationally accepted boundary, but rather as a line which demarcated British and Afghan spheres of influence. (For a detailed discussion of the Pushtunistan issue see: Louis Dupree, Afghanistan, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp.425-429) The Afghan government took a strong stand against the newly formed government of Pakistan and ever since then the relations between the two nations worsened through continuing propaganda wars, Pakistani blocking of transit goods to landlocked Afghanistan and provocation of tribal sentiments against the Pakistanis by the Afghans and vice versa. (see Emadi)

Daoud, who was always an advocate of the Pushtunistan issue, made the issue one of the major goals of his administration. The USSR encouraged and masterly maneuvered the Daoud regime to go after the Pakistanis over this issue by open support of the Afghan stand and by pouring in military and economic aid as well as opening up of new transit routes for Afghan goods to avoid Pakistani measures. The Americans on the other hand took the side of Pakistan over this issue and embarrassed the Afghans, who were not asking for American support over this contentious issue, but merely for their neutral stand and an objective mediator. In 1953, then Vice President Nixon on his visit to Kabul, lectured Daoud on the Afghan stand over Pushtunistan. Poullada who interviewed Mohammad Naim, who was present during the meeting, states that according to Naim, "Nixon was patronizing, dogmatic and offensive, strongly implying that the Afghan case was just nonsense." [see Poullada] On the next leg of his trip, Nixon went to Pakistan and publicly chastised Afghanistan's policy over the issue of Pushtunistan. Finally the U.S. in 1956 at the SEATO meeting formally recognized the Durand Line as the international boundary between Afghanistan and Pakistan, putting an end to any Afghan hope of an objective U.S. policy over this issue.

Economic Aid

Poullada states, however, that the situation started to improve beginning in 1956 with the arrival of Armin Meyer as Deputy Chief of Mission and Sheldon Mills replacing Angus Ward. The U.S. then put forth a new plan of economic aid to Afghanistan with three strategic aims: building air and road links to the West, introducing American higher education, and salvaging the Helmand Valley project. Despite the good intentions, none of these projects really succeeded to its full extent. The air and road links to the West was hampered due to the poor relations with Pakistan. The higher education program was somewhat more successful as the Americans helped in improving a number of faculties at Kabul University. The Helmand Valley project, however was a total failure (See the Helmand Valley Project).

While it is hard to pinpoint the reason(s) for these failures, it is generally believed that both sides were ill-prepared to carry out these projects. The Afghan system of government was inefficient and had too few technical experts. The American consultants who surveyed and put together the proposals, did not have a good knowledge of the working conditions and the intricacies of the Afghan society. Further the American diplomacy, specifically with regards to the military aid issue and the Pushtunistan issue, provided a difficult atmosphere for the success of the aid packages.[1]

The Embassy of Afghanistan, Washington, DC

From Aryana Encyclopedia

Starred The Embassy of Afghanistan: Afghan Representatives in Washington, DC from 1943 to the Present Abdul Hussain Aziz, Afghan Minister (1943-1948) Mohammed Naim Khan, Charge d'Affaires (1948-1950) Abdul Hamid Aziz, Charge d'Affaires (1950-1951).

History: Afghanistan and United States of America share a common destiny in fighting terror and tyranny and a deep rooted history of friendship and partnership. The first contact between Afghanistan and the United States of America ocured in the 1830's when a Pennsylvania adventurer, Josiah Harlan, traveled throughout the region, meeting Afghan both Shuja Shah and Dost Mahommed Khan. Shortly after Afghanistan regained her independence from Britain in 1919, King Amanullah, the reformist monarch of Afghanistan, dispatched General Wali Khan as the first Afghan envoy to Washington.

Full diplomatic relations between the Afghanistan and the United States began in 1934. Shortly after the end of World War II, His Majesty King Zahir Shah dispatched Abdul Hussein Aziz as the first Afghan Ambassador to the United States. Ambassador Aziz leased a historic building from an outgoing Supreme Court Chief Justice (The building was later purchased by Ambassador Abdullah Malikyar). That building continues to house the Embassy more than half a century later. President Roosevelt appointed William Hornibrook as the first U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan, on November 14, 1935.

President Dwight D. Eisenhower made history when he became the first U.S. President to visit Afghanistan on December 9, 1959. It is reported that seeing Afghanistan had long been a dream of President Eisenhower. Reflecting on his trip, President Eisenhower noted that he found the Afghan people to be "the most determined lot I have ever encountered.” The first U.S. visit by an Afghan Head of State took place in September 1963, when His Majesty King Zahir Shah on the invitation of President John F. Kennedy. Throughout the successive decades, the U.S.-Afghanistan partnership continued to grow, including the contribution of a dedicated group of Peace Corps volunteers between 1962 and 1979.

Sadly, the Embassy was not immune from the conflict that raged over the ocean within Afghanistan. After the Taliban seized control of Kabul, representatives from competing factions feuded over control of the Embassy building. Although the Taliban was not recognized by the United States, their representative in Washington occupied the Embassy building until the summer of 1997, whereupon the State Department officially closed the Embassy.

In January 2002, after the establishment of the Interim Afghan Administration, bilateral relations were restored between Afghanistan and the United States. In an emotional ceremony, the Afghan flag was once again raised outside the Embassy in the presence of then Chairman Hamid Karzai and U.S. officials. The Embassy building, which had been neglected and lay in disrepair, was renovated and reopened in June of 2002. The Embassy is now under the leadership of Ambassador Said Tayeb Jawad and has been lauded by numerous U.S. officials as being one of the most hard-working missions in all of Washington, DC. Ambassador Jawad is also non-resident envoy to: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama and Uruguay.

Afghan Representatives in Washington, D.C. from 1943 to the Present

Abdul Hussain Aziz, Afghan Minister (1943-1948)
Mohammed Naim Khan, Charge d'Affaires (1948-1950)
Abdul Hamid Aziz, Charge d'Affaires (1950-1951)
Mohammed Kabir Ludin, Ambassador (1953-1956)
Dr. Najibullah Torwayana, Ambassador (1956-1958)
Mohammed Hashim Maiwandwal, Ambassador (1958-1963)
Dr. Abdul Majid, Ambassador (1963-1967)
Abdullah Malikyar, Ambassador (1967-1978)
Dr. Abdul Waheed Karim, Ambassador (1978-80)
Noor Ahmad Noor, Ambassador (1980-1981)
Dr. Mohed Salem Spartak, charge d'affaires (1982-1984)
Mohammad Haidar Rafiq, charge d'affaires (1984-1985)
Mohammad Ashraf Samimi, charge d'affaires (1985-1986)
Mr. Rouhullah Erfaqi (1986-1987)
Mia Gul, charge d'affaires (1988-1990)
Abdul Ghafoor Jawshan, charge d'affaires (1990-1992)
Abdul Rahim, charge d'affaires (1992-1994)
Yar Mohammad Mohabat, charge d'affaires (1994-1995)
Haroun Amin, charge d'affaires (2002)
Isaq Sharhyar, Ambassador (2002-2003)
Said T. Jawad, Ambassador (2003-Present)

American Ambassadors to Afghanistan from 1935 to the Present

William H. Hornibrook (1935-1936) - Minister Plenipotentiary
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1940-1942) - Minister Plenipotentiary
Cornelius Van Hemert Engert (1942-1945) - Minister Plenipotentiary
Ely E. Palmer (1945-1948) - Minister Plenipotentiary
Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr. (1949-1951) - First formal ambassador
George Robert Merrell (1951-1952)
Angus I. Ward (1952-1956)
Sheldon T. Mills (1956-1959)
Henry A. Byroade (1959-1962)
John M. Steeves (1962-1966)
Robert G. Neumann (1966-1973)
Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. (1973-1978)
Adolph Dubs (1978-1979)

From 1979 – 2001, the United States did not have an Ambassador posted in Afghanistan, although U.S. interests in Afghanistan were represented by a number of charge d'affaires. From 1981 to 2002, there was no official U.S. embassy in Kabul

James F. Dobbins (2001) - Special US Ambassador to oversee reopening of embassy, not official ambassador

Ryan C. Crocker (2001-2002) - charge d'affaires before official ambassador could be chosen

Robert Finn (2002-2003)
Zalmay Khalilzad (2003-2005)
Ronald E. Neumann (2005-2007)
William B. Wood (2007-2009)
Karl Eikenberry (2009-Present)[*]

US Ambassador to Afghanistan

04-May-1935	16-Mar-1936	William H. Hornibrook
19-May-1941	25-Jul-1942	Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.
02-Jul-1942	17-Aug-1945	Cornelius Van H. Engert
06-Dec-1945	18-Nov-1948	Ely E. Palmer
16-Aug-1949	19-Jan-1951	Louis G. Dreyfus, Jr.
28-Jun-1951	03-May-1952	George R. Merrell
08-Nov-1952	03-Mar-1956	Angus Ward
06-May-1956	03-Feb-1959	Sheldon T. Mills
21-Mar-1959	19-Jan-1962	Henry A. Byroade
20-Mar-1962	21-Jul-1966	John M. Steeves
19-Feb-1967	10-Sep-1973	Robert G. Neumann
21-Nov-1973	14-Jun-1978	Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.
12-Jul-1978	14-Feb-1979	Adolph Dubs (Assassinated)
Feb-1979	Feb-1980	J. Bruce Amstutz (Interim)
Feb-1980	Jan-1982	Hawthorne Q. Mills (Interim)
Jan-1982	May-1983	Charles F. Dunbar (Interim)
Jun-1983	Mar-1986	Edward Hurwitz (Interim)
Mar-1986	Sep-1987	James M. Ealum (Interim)
Sep-1987	Jan-1989	John D. Glassman (Interim)
Embassy in Kabul closed 30-Jan-1989
Liaison Office in Kabul reopened 17-Dec-2001
02-Jan-2002	Apr-2002	Ryan C. Crocker (Interim)
03-Apr-2002	01-Aug-2003	Robert Finn
28-Nov-2003	20-Jun-2005	Zalmay Khalilzad
01-Aug-2005	02-Mar-2007	Ronald E. Neumann
16-Apr-2007	03-Apr-2009	William B. Wood
29-Apr-2009		present Karl W. Eikenberry[*]

Coins of ancient Afghanistan

From Aryana Encyclopedia

These ten silver Greco-Bactrian coins are part of the nearly 2,000 silver and gold coins recovered in a National Geographic project. The coins are among the many Afghan museum artifacts saved from 25 years of war and political upheaval.
From the famous Kunduz hoard in northern Afghanistan, the coins make up a virtual portrait gallery of the kings, starting with rulers in the fifth century B.C.

Coin of Euthydemus I, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c. 223 BCE - c.200 BCE), ruler of Bactria, Sogdiana, Ferghana, Arachosia.

Coin of Euthydemus II, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c. 223 BCE - c.200 BCE) and (c.180 BCE), ruler of Bactria

Coin of Antimachus I, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c.185 BCE - c. 170 BCE), ruler of Bactria, Paropamisadae, Arachosia

Coin of Eucratides I, The most powerful of the Greco-Bactrian rulers (c.170 BCE - c. 145 BCE), ruler of Bactria, Sogdiana, Paropamisadae, Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Eucratides I, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c.170 BCE - c. 145 BCE), ruler of Bactria, Sogdiana, Paropamisadae, Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Plato, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c. 166 BCE), ruler of of Bactria and Sogdiana

Coin of Eucratides II, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c.145 BCE - c. 140 BCE), ruler of Bactria and Sogdiana

Coin of Heliocles I, Greco-Bactrian ruler (c.145 BCE - c. 130 BCE), ruler of of Bactria and Sogdiana

Coin of Agathocles, Indo-Greek ruler (c.190 BCE - c. 180 BCE), ruler of Paropamisadae

Coin of Agathocles, Indo-Greek ruler (c.190 BCE - c. 180 BCE), ruler of Paropamisadae

Coin of Apollodotus I, Indo-Greek ruler (c.180 BCE - c. 160 BCE), ruler of Paropamisadae, Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Menander I, Indo-Greek ruler (c.155 BCE - c. 130 BCE), ruler of Paropamisadae, Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Zoilos I, Indo-Greek ruler (c.130 BCE - c. 120 BCE), ruler of Paropamisadae and Arachosia

Coin of Agathokleia, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 130 BC - c. 120 BC), ruler of Gandhara

Coin of Lysias, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 120 BC - c. 110 BC), ruler of Paropamisadae and Arachosia

Coin of Antialcidas, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 110 BC - c. 100 BC), ruler of Paropamisadae and Arachosia

Coin of Demetrius III, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 100 BC), ruler of Gandhara

Coin of Philoxenus, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 100 BC - c. 95 BC), ruler of Paropamisadae, Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Theophilos, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 90 BC), ruler of Paropamisadae

Coin of Menander II, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 90 BC - c. 85 BC), ruler of Arachosia and Gandhara

Coin of Hermaeus, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 90 BC - c. 70 BC), ruler of Paropamisadae

Coin of Archebios, Indo-Greek ruler (c. 90 BC - c. 70 BC), ruler of Arachosia and Gandhara

Silver tetradrachm of Maues, Indo-Scythian ruler (c. 85 BC - c. 60 BC)

Silver tetradrachm of Vonones, Indo-Scythian ruler (c. 75 BC - c. 65 BC)

Silver tetradrachm of Azes I, Indo-Scythian ruler (c. 57 BC - c. 35 BC)

Silver tetradrachm of Azilises, Indo-Scythian ruler (c. 57 BC - c. 35 BC)

Roman coin of Tiberius - Tillya Tepe, Tomb III, A.D. 14-37, Gold
Diam. 1.9 cm, National Museum of Afghanistan, Kabul

Roman coin of Tiberius - Tillya Tepe, Tomb III, A.D. 14-37, Gold, Diam. 1.9 cm, National Museum of Afghanistan, Kabul

coin of Gondophares, founder of Indo-Parthian kingdom, Indo-Parthian ruler (20-50 AD CE)

coin of Abdagases I, Indo-Parthian ruler, ruled during the first decades of the first century AD

Silver tetradrachm of Heraios, clan chief of the Kushans, one of the five constituent tribes of the Yuezhi confederacy in Bactria in the early first century CE, Kushan ruler (c. 1-30 CE)

coin of Kujula Kadphises, Kushan ruler (c. 30-80 CE)

coin of Vima Taktu, Kushan ruler (c. 80-105 CE), bronze

coin of Vima Kadphises, Kushan ruler (c. 105-127 CE), gold

coin of Kanishka I, Kushan ruler (c. 127-147 CE), gold

coin of Vasudeva I, Kushan ruler (c. 191 - c. 230 CE), gold

coin of Hormozd I (Great) Kushānshāhānshāh (meaning king of kings), Indo-Sassanid ruler (circa 265 - 295)

coin of Hormozd I (Great) Kushānshāhānshāh, Indo-Sassanid ruler (circa 265 - 295)

coin of Varhran, Kidarite ruler (c. 425-? CE)

coin of Malka, Hephtalite ruler (c. 475-576)

Coin of Samanta Deva, Shahi Kings of Kabul & Gandhara (circa AD 850-1000),
Obv: Rider bearing lance on caparisoned horse facing right.Devnagari Legends: 'bhi '?.
Rev:Recumbent bull facing left, trishula on bull's rump, Devnagari Legends: Sri Samanta Deva.